

Sécurité des réseaux industriels (OT)

Analyse approfondie de Cyber Vision



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Orange Cyberdefense



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Cisco





- **Quel est le 1er mot qui vous viens à l'esprit lorsque l'on parle de cyber-sécurité industrielle ?**



- The Slido app must be installed on every computer you're presenting from

• Comment jugez vous la sécurité de vos réseaux OT ?





• Votre entreprise est-elle impactée par NIS2 ?

Agenda

- 01 Les enjeux cyber dans l'OT
- 02 Etapes de sécurisation des réseaux OT
- 03 Visibilité : Cisco Cyber Vision
- 04 Segmentation : ISE & FMC
- 05 Gestion des accès distant : SEA
- 06 Surveillance et répons à incident : Splunk
- 07 Cas clients

Agenda


- 01 Les enjeux cyber dans l'OT
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The reality of industry digitization

Increased connectivity results in more cyberattacks

2024 saw:

- At least **one cyberattack every week** against OT assets caused physical consequences in 2024
- **146% increase** in sites impacted by cyberattacks with physical consequences
- Nation state attacks have **tripled**



Waterfall 2025 OT Cyber Security Threat Report

Industrial Security Challenges are scary



Internet accessible
Industrial Control Systems



Port-forwarding on LTE
backdoors



Legacy Windows devices
with known exploits



More state sponsorship to
exploit vulnerabilities

.....



AI enhancements have introduced even more threats, and made **exploitation easier than ever**



AI Generated code to exploit vulnerabilities
(Hacker GPT)



Remote Access backdoors built into autonomous
robots (Unitree Go1 Robot Dogs)



Adaptive malware bypassing IPS signatures

Common issues in industrial operations



Lack of OT visibility



Vulnerable assets



Lack of segmentation



Limited OT security
skill sets



Poor access control



Ineffective workflow
between OT and IT

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The journey to secure operational networks



Understand the OT
security posture
with OT visibility

Limit blast radius
with network
segmentation

Control risks from
remote access to
OT assets

Monitor OT
networks in the
SOC

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Step #1: Deploying OT Visibility




Understand the OT
security posture
with OT visibility

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with network
segmentation

Control risks from
remote access to
OT assets

Monitor OT
networks in the
SOC

Most organizations do not
have visibility into their
critical assets



Cisco Cyber Vision “turns on the lights” for industries



Inventory OT assets and their communications



Spot vulnerabilities to patch or mitigate




Create access policies to segment networks



Detect bypass or leaks in the IDMZ



Drive compliance and governance



Automated discovery of assets, vulnerabilities, and communication across the industrial network

Cisco Cyber Vision

Visibility & Security Platform
for the Industrial IoT



Visibility

OT asset inventory
Communication patterns




Security Posture

Device vulnerabilities
Risk scoring



Zone Segmentation


Automate segmentation below
the IDMZ to protect operations



Cyber Vision

Visibility built-in,
not bolted on


Cisco industrial network
sees everything, so you
gain visibility at scale



Visibility into connected industrial assets

Understand the identity of all assets in the environment
gain insight into network communications

Component



1769-L16ER/B LOGIX5316ER

Paint_Line_2 ▲ high

IP: 192.168.249.50

MAC: f4:54:33:91:cb:ee

[Edit](#) [Manage group](#)

First activity

Apr 14, 2021 11:45:12 AM

Last activity

Apr 16, 2021 11:00:01 AM

Tags

Controller , Rockwell Automation

Activity tags

Stop CPU , Diagnostics , Read Var , Write Var , Low Volume ...3+

14

Flows

9

Events

10

Vulnerabilities

-

Credential

-

Variable

Basics

Security

Activity

Automation

Properties

Tags

Sensor

Properties

vendor-name: Rockwell Automation

fw-version: 31.011

model-ref: 1769-L16ER/B LOGIX5316ER

serial-number: 60771949

name: 1769-L16ER/B LOGIX5316ER

ip: 192.168.249.50

public-ip: no

mac: f4:54:33:91:cb:ee

enip-status-ra-mi

enip-cpname: Se

enip-serial: 6077

enip-status-ra-ma

vendor: Rockwe

name-vendorip: R

name-enip: 1769

enip-name: 1769

enip-devicetype: I

enip-productcode

enip-version: 31.

enip-vendor: Roc

work activities

Drilling Machine

SIEMENS

Siemens 192.168.105.150

26

PLC_3

SIEMENS

Siemens 192.168.105.

Super 192.168.105.1

32

PLC_1

SuperMICR

Dell 192.168.105.241

S7-400 station

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Identify known asset vulnerabilities so you can patch or protect them before they are exploited


73 Vulnerabilities

10 most matched vulnerabilities

Vulnerability ID	Vulnerability Description	Affected Components
CVE-2015-5627	Yokogawa Multiple Products Buffer Overflow Vulnerabilities - CVE-2015-5627	2 affected components
CVE-2020-5609	Path Traversal Vulnerability in Yokogawa CENTUM	2 affected components
CVE-2019-10936	Denial-of-Service Vulnerability in Profinet Devices	3 affected components
CVE-2017-12741	Multiple Siemens Products CVE-2017-12741 Denial of Service Vulnerability	3 affected components
CVE-2018-16196	Yokogawa Vnet/IP Open Communication Driver Vulnerabilities	2 affected components
CVE-2014-0781	Yokogawa CENTUM 'BKCLogSvr.exe' Heap Based Buffer Overflow...	2 affected components
CVE-2014-3888	Yokogawa CENTUM BKFSim_vhfd.exe Buffer Overflow - Packet Storm	2 affected components
CVE-2019-13940	Uncontrolled Resource Consumption Vulnerability in Siemens SIMATIC S7	2 affected components
CVE-2017-2680	Multiple Denial of Service Vulnerabilities on Siemens devices using the...	3 affected components
CVE-2019-5909	Yokogawa License Manager Service Vulnerabilities	2 affected components


Identify & Stop iDMZ Leaks







Filter subnets to identify traffic to external networks and stop unauthorized leaks past the DMZ



Detect Malicious Intrusions

Detect malicious intrusions with Snort IDS and Talos threat intelligence





Today

Auto-follow ☐

17

499

579

637

categorySignature based DetectionX

severityveryhighX

Search an event

Day

Week

16:12:09.236Signature based DetectionSnort allow on TCP id 27679 with signature A Network Trojan was detected

Snort Event

- Occured at: 10/04-14:44:21.061415
- Sensor: SENSORVM-INT17233
- Action: allow
- Gid: 1
- Signature ID: 27679
- Priority: 1
- Rule: 1:27679:4 (Revision4)
- Classification: A Network Trojan was detected

- In network interface: /data/tmp/BIN_Kuluoz-Asprox_9F842AD20C50AD1AAB41F20B321E
- Message: MALWARE-CNC Win.Trojan.Kuluoz variant outbound connection
- From 192.168.248.165:2538 To 85.214.114.16:8080 (00:0C:29:D9:6F:DB -> 00:50:00:00:00:00)
- Protocol: TCP
- Direction: C2S
- Ethernet type: 0x800
- Service: unknown
- VLAN: 0

Related data: [DOWNLOAD DATA](#)

16:12:18.255Signature based DetectionSnort allow on TCP id 42339 with signature Attempted Information Leak

Snort Event

- Occured at: 04/17-16:17:01.746538
- Sensor: SENSORVM-INT17233
- Action: allow
- Gid: 1
- Signature ID: 42339
- Priority: 2
- Rule: 1:42339:3 (Revision3)
- Classification: Attempted Information Leak

- In network interface: /data/tmp/eternalromance-success-2008r2.pcap
- Message: OS-WINDOWS Microsoft Windows SMB possible leak of kernel heap memory
- From 172.23.33.10:445 To 10.99.99.8:51661 (00:0C:29:9E:89:5F -> 00:2A:E3:CC:A2:2E)
- Protocol: TCP
- Direction: S2C
- Ethernet type: 0x800
- Service: netbios-ssn
- VLAN: 0

Related data: [DOWNLOAD DATA](#)

16:12:18.258Signature based DetectionSnort allow on TCP id 50626 with signature Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain


Snort Event

- Occured at: 04/17-16:17:01.754745
- Sensor: SENSORVM-INT17233
- Action: allow
- Gid: 1
- Signature ID: 50626
- Priority: 1
- Rule: 1:50626:1 (Revision1)
- Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain

- In network interface: /data/tmp/eternalromance-success-2008r2.pcap
- Message: OS-WINDOWS Microsoft Windows raw WriteAndX InData pointer attempt
- From 10.99.99.8:51661 To 172.23.33.10:445 (00:2A:E3:CC:A2:2E -> 00:00:00:00:00:00)
- Protocol: TCP
- Direction: C2S
- Ethernet type: 0x800
- Service: netbios-ssn
- VLAN: 0

Related data: [DOWNLOAD DATA](#)

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
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Track your Risk Exposure

Asset risk scoring based on impact and likelihood to help you improve compliance



Overview



The best achievable score is 44
It can be reached by patching all vulnerabilities and removing insecure traffic.

Details

The score was computed on May 24, 2021 10:00:06 PM by Cisco Cyber Vision as follows:

Criteria	Matching	Distribution	Des
Device type	SCS0102 type: Controller	<div><div></div>13%</div>	CC cou
Group impact	SCS0102 group: Building K. It has an industrial impact ▲ very high.	<div><div></div>51%</div>	
Activities	No matching activity	<div><div></div>0%</div>	
Vulnerabilities	SCS0102 most impacting vulnerability is Path Traversal Vulnerability in Yokogawa CENTUM	<div><div></div>36%</div>	Pat Yok CVI CVS Suc vuln una ...sh See

Measure Progress with Reports

Track risk management improvements and show progress to management with historical reports

Key Findings

Filter Criteria: All data Preset

This report is an automated summary that captures a list of security events found on the devices in the All data Preset. 8:04 am UTC

Risk score	Total Devices
37	4

Security Insights

Severity	Findings
High	1 devices have been identified
High	1 devices have been attacked
Medium	3 devices have run DNS

DNS Queries to Remote Access Domain Names

Cisco Cyber Vision maintains a list of known remote access domains to access internal devices. The table below depicts those devices of these domains, indicating that these devices may have been r

Device Name	Device IP	Group	Domain
192.168.0.72	192.168.0.72	-	client.teamvie
192.168.0.72	192.168.0.72	-	de-fra-an: r048.rout
192.168.0.72	192.168.0.72	-	router13.1

Attempted Remote Access Communications

Cisco Cyber Vision maintains a list of known domains that are internal devices. The table below depicts those internal devices remotely from one of these domains listed next to it.

Device Name	Device IP	Group	Remote Name
192.168.0.72	192.168.0.72	-	client.teamvie

Key Findings

Filter Criteria: -

This report is an automated summary that captures all the security events found on the devices in the - by Cisco Cyber Vision. 8:04 am UTC

Risk score	Devices	Vulnerable Devices	Events
45.0	34	7	

Security Insights


Severity	Findings
Critical	46 critical and high severity vulnera
Critical	4 devices have a risk score > 70
High	3 devices found communicating wit
High	47 devices have been remotely acce
High	2 devices found using 11 unsecured
High	2 devices using clear text password:

Top 5 Vendors seen

Vendor	Number of Devices
ABB Oy / Medium Voltage Products	
Cisco Systems Inc	
ASIX ELECTRONICS CORP.	
Quanta Storage Inc.	


Vulnerabilities

Filter Criteria: -




CVE ID	Vulnerability Name	CVSS Score	Severity	Number of affected devices
CVE-2017-12741	Multiple Siemens Products CVE-2017-12741 Denial of Service Vulnerability	7.5	High	4
CVE-2019-10936	Denial-of-Service Vulnerability in Profinet Devices	7.5	High	4
CVE-2017-2680	Multiple Denial of Service Vulnerabilities on Siemens devices using the PROFINET Discovery and Configuration Protocol	6.5	Medium	4
CVE-2022-30694	Missing CSRF Protection in the Web Server Login Page of Siemens Industrial Controllers	6.5	Medium	4
CVE-2019-6568	Denial Of Service Vulnerability in Web-server of Industrial Products - Siemens	7.5	High	3

Use AI to streamline network segmentation and protect operations




OT asset inventory projects highlight flat, unsegmented networks



Cyber Vision AI-based clustering automatically creates security zones to drive network segmentation using Firewalls or NAC

Cyber Vision extends IT security to your industrial settings



OT context and insights that are foundational to using
IT security tools to secure industrial networks

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Step #2: Network Segmentation



Understand the OT
security posture
with OT visibility

Limit blast radius
with network
segmentation

Control risks from
remote access to
OT assets

Monitor OT
networks in the
SOC

Preventative measures are required to protect OT networks, not just visibility



- ⚠️ **Malware** can easily spread through the entire OT network
- ⚠️ An attacker only needs to **exploit one** of many vulnerabilities to cause serious damage
- ⚠️ Implementing access control can cause **downtime** due to legitimate process flows getting blocked

First identify what the scope of segmentation is

Use Case #1 Protect the IT / OT Boundary

If the IT network is exploited, there should be no direct path to the critical network

Use the Cisco Secure Firewall to control traffic between IT and OT

Use Case #2 Protect OT from the Industrial Data Center


Rising AI investments have expanded the IDC and introduced more ways for attackers to gain a foothold to the network.

Use the Cisco Secure Firewall to protect the OT network from the IDC

Use Case #3 Prevent Lateral Movement in the Control Network

If one process zone is compromised, others should continue to run without interruption.


Use Cisco Identity Services Engine and go on the journey to Zero Trust for OT



Securing Plant Networks with Cisco Secure Firewall

Common OT firewall mistake


Placing firewalls at the edge of every process zone



- If I have 200 cell/area zones, that means 200 new firewalls
 - More hardware to manage
 - More policies to manage
 - Patch management
 - ...
- Interzone communication means traffic must flow through two separate firewalls which adds unnecessary latency, especially if traffic is subject to an IPS
- Rugged firewalls are best suited to Intra-zone communication, for once off use cases, and only if advanced protection features are required

Better approach to OT firewall #1


Cisco Secure Firewall at the industrial data center



- Industrial Data Center (IDC) typically resides below DMZ firewall, meaning no protection between it and the plant floor
- IDC may be exposed to the Internet for modern applications, increasing its attack surface
- Workloads are being moved from the cell/area zones to the IDC, meaning critical traffic will flow back and forth
- It is critical we provide a security barrier between the virtual workloads and the physical devices

Better approach to OT firewall #2


Cisco Secure Firewall as routing point for the OT network



- VLANs are often overlooked for security because by themselves they offer little protection
- Use a firewall to route between VLANs so all routed traffic is subject to firewall enforcement
- Enables you to place a small cluster of firewalls to protect a full plant instead of a unique firewall per zone

Better approach to OT firewall #3

Only terminate critical VLANs at the firewall




- Many manufacturing plants have a mix of OT and IT / non-critical VLANs within an environment
- Not all traffic needs to traverse a firewall
- Dedicate firewalls for protection of OT assets
- Main goal is to reduce the blast radius. If one zone is compromised, our goal is to limit downtime to that one zone

Enhancing firewall policies with OT context from Cyber Vision




Grouping assets in Cyber Vision



CSDAC

Creates Dynamic Attributes in FMC




Policies enforced by Cisco Secure Firewall



Zero downtime with OT controlled **adaptive firewall rules**

Securing Plant Networks with Cisco Identity Services Engine


Organizations are adopting the IEC62443 Zones & Conduits Model for segmenting their OT network



- **Zones** represent a group of devices on based on functional, logical or physical relationships
- **Conduits** represent the networking equipment used to communicate across zones


The intent is to move from one flat OT network to multiple small OT networks with security controls in between

A journey to implementing micro segmentation in OT



Virtual Segmentation

Visualizing your zones and conduits and reacting to data observed between zones



Macro Segmentation

Pushing policy across "large" zones. For example, the distribution switches [Intra Cell segmentation](#)




Micro Segmentation

Pushing policies across "small" zones. For example, the industrial ethernet switches for [Inter Cell segmentation](#)


A micro segmentation project should never start with micro segmentation. Start with macro and do micro segmentation one zone at a time!

First build your Zones & Conduits in Cyber Vision...

Cyber Vision discovers OT assets...





...and groups them into logical zones...



OT asset inventory projects highlight flat, unsegmented networks


Cyber Vision helps OT teams document security zones to drive segmentation

.... then push policy back into the network



Adaptive segmentation enforced by IT, controlled by OT

Cisco TrustSec – Hybrid Macro / Micro Segmentation




Segmentation driven by OT Context from Cyber Vision



This user interface understands industrial processes. I can group assets into zones



I now have OT context to build the right network access policies




Cisco Cyber Vision Map View

	Zone 1	Zone 2	PLC	MES
Zone 1	✓	X	✓	X
Zone 2	X	✓	✓	X
PLC	✓	✓	✓	✓
MES	X	X	✓	✓

Cisco ISE Policy Matrix


dACL
SGT
VLAN

Segmentation of industrial network



Debunking TrustSec myths

A full Cisco network is NOT required for TrustSec



- The TrustSec domain will act as the conduit between zones
- All traffic within a zone is free to communicate
- Use Cyber Vision to gain visibility inside the zone
- Use ISE to control traffic between zones

Just because a network can do micro segmentation does not mean you should turn it on immediately


What Devices Support SGT Enforcement?

Enforcement Nodes: Can actively block traffic



Catalyst Switches

Typically used at the distribution & core



NEW

IE3500, IE3400, IE9300

Typically used at access & aggregation

SXP Speakers: Can share IP to SGT information over SXP but cannot enforce traffic. Used for authentication, not for enforcement



- IE3300
- IE3200
- IE3100
- IE2000

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Step #3: Secure Remote Access



Understand the OT security posture with OT visibility

Limit blast radius with network segmentation

Control risks from remote access to OT assets

Monitor OT networks in the SOC

Unsecure OT remote access is a major threat to industrial operations

Jaguar Land Rover Breached by HELLCAT Ransomware Group using Jira Credentials

By [Kaaviya](#) - March 17, 2025

Credential abuse and **social engineering** is the most common way to breach a network

CISA Warns of Fortinet FortiOS Authentication Bypass Vulnerability Exploited in Wild

By [Guru Baran](#) - March 19, 2025

Vulnerability exploits on edge infrastructure is on the rise. Anything with a public IP address will be attacked.

Malware

RansomHub Breach: Six-Day Attack Leveraged RDP, RMM Tools & Mimikatz for Data Exfiltration & Ransomware

 [Ddos](#)  June 30, 2025

Traditional remote access gateways do not stop the **risk of lateral movement**

OT remote access options are either security backdoors or come with many trade-offs



Ad-Hoc Software

Often installed on operator workstations

Backdoor to IT security policies



Cellular Gateways

Dedicated hardware installed by machine builders

Backdoor to IT security policies



VPN


Always-On, All-or-Nothing access

Need additional controls to deny full network access

Enhance existing Jump Servers with Zero-Trust

Supercharge your existing remote access setup with modern security capabilities


- Keep existing jump servers to maintain workflows and simplify change
- Replace insecure VPNs and enforce robust access control with SEA ensuring only authorized users have access only at specific times
- Gain new control with SEA recording sessions or inspecting file transfer*
- Simplify operations with cloud-based policy management that OT can use



Zero-Trust Security Controls

Ensure only trusted users can connect and when.

- **Verify user** identities with MFA and SSO, integrating with your IdP
- **Prevent malware** intrusion by verifying compliance of remote user's computers using Cisco Duo
- **Enforce schedules** to allow access only at time of need



Least Privilege Access Controls

Never expose your entire network and prevent lateral movement.

- Only assets you specify can be accessed by the remote users you choose
- Using only the protocols allowed
- Only on the days and times allowed

Only assets you select can be accessed...

All Access Methods (5)

Refresh As of: Sep 7, 2023 3:15 PM

IR1101-WebApp (WEB_APP)
Via Web App
IR1101-SEA

Availability: Always Active
Last Accessed: Never

NUC - RDP (RDP)
Via RDP
IR1101-SEA

Availability: Always Active
Last Accessed: 8 minutes ago

PLC (SEA Plus) (SEA_PLUS)
Via SEA Plus
IR1101-SEA

Availability: Always Active

RPi-Linux-VNC (VNC)
Via VNC
IR1101-SEA

Availability: Always Active
Last Accessed: 9 minutes ago

System Management / Network Device Details

1769-L16ER/B

Connected Client Details

Client Name	1769-L16ER/B
Device Type	PLC
Description	Conveyor belt controller

Access Methods (2)

Search Table

+ Add Access Method

Access Method Name

1769-L16ER/B (SEA_PLUS)

Connected Client Details

Client Name	1769-L16ER/B
IP Address/Host Name	192.168.100.101

Access Method Details

Access Method*

- SSH
- RDP
- VNC
- Web App
- Telnet


...using the protocols you choose

Clientless and Agent-based Access


Get total control of how users can access assets while offering flexibility and ease of use.

- **Clientless:** Users only need a browser to access remote assets using RDP, VNC, SSH, Telnet or HTTP(S)
- **Agent-based:** Use native desktop clients for advanced tasks, only once computer has been verified for compliance with health policies

Access remote assets with just a browser



Use native client after security posture check



OT Self-Service: On-Demand Remote Access

Help OT teams seamlessly drive operations with contractors while maintaining controls

- Remote users can request access when they need it. No need to preconfigure ever changing users
- Privileged users receive email notifications to grant access on-demand

On-demand remote access approval

← Access Control Groups Refresh As of Sep 8, 2021 10:17 AM (PST)

Access Control Group 1

Group Details
[Edit](#) [Delete](#)
Description
-
Group Type
Request Access
Creation Date
Apr 5, 2024 2:31 PM
Last Updated
Apr 5, 2024 2:31 PM
Group Enabled
Yes
Enforce Inline Recording ⓘ
Off

Assigned Users 2

Assigned Remote Sessions 5

Access Approvers 2
Limit access approval notifications below. If none are selected, all access approvers in the organization are notified for each remote session request.

[+ Add access approver](#) [Settings](#)

User	Actions
user@email.com	
user@email.com	

Rows per page 10 1-10 of 99 |< < > >|

Remote User Identity Threat Detection

Detect threats related to remote user identity

- Login from unapproved geolocation
- Login outside working hours
- Auto deactivation of unused accounts

Service Secure Equipment Access

Dashboard

Alerts

Remote Sessions

Access Management

System Management

Audit Reports

Configuration

IoT Operations Dashboard

alex@email.com Business Corp, Inc

Active Alerts

Login From Prohibited Location Critical

China

Refresh As of Jun 6, 2024 10:17 AM

Summary

2 users have logged in from China 3 times: 1 access administrator, and 1 remote user.

Active instances

User Alert rule

Search Days inactive Filters 2 results

User	Location	Alert Rules	Occurrences	Last Time Detected
user1@email.com	China	2	2	Dec 12, 2024 10:31 AM
user2@email.com	China	1	1	Dec 12, 2024 8:15 PM

Service Secure Equipment Access

Dashboard

Alerts

Remote Sessions

Access Management

System Management

Audit Reports

Configuration

IoT Operations Dashboard

alex@email.com Business Corp, Inc

Active Alerts

Login Outside of Working Hours Medium

username@email.com

Refresh As of Jun 6, 2024 10:17 AM

Summary

user@email.com logged in 2 times outside of approved working hours.

Logins outside of approved hours

PDT

Thursday Dec 12, 2024

Tuesday Dec 10, 2024

Designated working hours Login with no sessions Login with sessions

Active instances

User Alert rule

Search Settings

Login Time	Discrepancy	Alert Rules	Occurrences	Severity	Last Time Detected
Dec 12, 2024 10:31 PM	3 hr 1 min	1	1	Medium	Dec 12, 2024 10:31 PM
Dec 10, 2024 2:15 AM	4 hr 30 min	1	1	Medium	Dec 10, 2024 2:15 AM

Session Recording, Monitoring, and Termination

Monitoring, joining, and terminating active sessions

Real-time visibility on active and past sessions for incident response, investigations, and compliance.

- Monitor active sessions from anywhere in the world
- Terminate remote user session if you detect suspicious activity
- Record or Join sessions for training or audit purposes

Access Control Groups Users <u>Active Sessions</u> Session History						
Active Sessions (4)						
Q Search Table						
Refresh As of: Aug 10, 2023 12:05 PM						
Connected Client	Access Method	User	Session Start	Duration	Monitor	Security
External-switch	External-switch (SSH)	alzaytse@cisco.com	2 minutes ago	Unscheduled	Join Session	Terminate
External-switch-Linux-Server	External-switch-Linux-Server (VNC)	alzaytse@cisco.com	a minute ago	Unscheduled	Join Session	Terminate



Access Control Groups Users Active Sessions <u>Session History</u>						
Session History (7)						
Q maiyub						
Start Date: Apr 11, 2023 End Date: Aug 10, 2023 Only Show Recorded Sessions						
Session Start	Session End	Connected Client	Access Method	User	Terminated	Recorded
Aug 8, 2023 6:23 PM	Aug 8, 2023 6:24 PM	SSH_Session	SSH_Session (SSH)	maiyub@cisco.com	No	Yes
Aug 1, 2023 11:08 AM	Aug 1, 2023 11:09 AM	IR1101-FF	IR1101-FF (SSH)	maiyub@cisco.com	Yes	
Aug 1, 2023 1:01 AM	Aug 1, 2023 1:02 AM	IR1101-FF	IR1101-FF (SSH)	maiyub@cisco.com	Yes	
Aug 1, 2023 12:55 AM	Aug 1, 2023 12:56 AM	IR1100_SSH_Client_1	IR1100_SSH_Client_1 (SSH)	maiyub@cisco.com	No	No
Aug 1, 2023 12:48 AM	Aug 1, 2023 12:49 AM	IR1101-FF	IR1101-FF (SSH)	maiyub@cisco.com	Yes	Yes
Aug 1, 2023 12:45 AM	Aug 1, 2023 12:45 AM	self_SSH	self_SSH (SSH)	maiyub@cisco.com	No	No
Aug 1, 2023 12:44 AM	Aug 1, 2023 12:44 AM	IR1101-FF	IR1101-FF backup	maiyub@cisco.com	No	No

Session history, logs, and recordings

- View Full Auditing Info
- View Screen Recording
- Download Screen Recording
- Delete Screen Recording

Agenda

- 01 Les enjeux cyber dans l'OT
- 02 Etapes de sécurisation des réseaux OT
- 03 Visibilité : Cisco Cyber Vision
- 04 Segmentation : ISE & FMC
- 05 Gestion des accès distant : SEA
- 06 Surveillance et répons à incident : Splunk**
- 07 Cas clients

Step #4: Unify IT and OT visibility into the SOC



Understand the OT
security posture
with OT visibility



Limit blast radius
with network
segmentation




Control risks from
remote access to
OT assets



Monitor OT
networks in the
SOC

A siloed approach is not enough to secure OT


Detecting threats requires cross-domain visibility



Splunk for OT Security

Detect and remediate threats across IT & OT

- ✓ Unified IT/OT security events management
- ✓ Aggregate all Cyber Vision deployments
- ✓ Schedule reports over email
- ✓ Perimeter Monitoring
- ✓ Risk Based Alerting
- ✓ MITRE ATT&CK ICS correlation rules



Agenda

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UNILIN: A global leader in the flooring industry

Business drivers

- An audit highlighted OT network as a huge cyber risk
- IT had no visibility into OT network
- IT wanted a solution which was easy to deploy and use and that could integrate with their existing security tool set (Firepower, Stealthwatch, SecureX and Splunk)

Solution

- Chose Cisco IE3x00 switches as the standard network foundation
- Deployed Cyber Vision sensor on Cisco IE switches to gain 100% visibility
- Cyber Vision fully integrated with the IT security tools

Outcome

- IT gets comprehensive OT information in their IT security tools
- OT leverages Cyber Vision for insights into OT processes



<https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/case-studies-customer-success-stories/unilin-group.html>

Albuquerque Bernalillo County Water Utility Authority

Business drivers

- New requirements set by America's Water Infrastructure Act (AWIA) regulatory compliance
- Aging network and security infrastructure

Solution

- Complete refresh and update of the SCADA network infrastructure with a focus on cybersecurity
- Upgraded to Cisco Catalyst IE3400 and Catalyst 9300 with embedded Cyber Vision Sensor
- Deployed ISA3000 firewalls to protect zones

Outcome

- Increased security with comprehensive visibility on OT assets
- Standardized platforms for IT/OT to share same data and better collaborate. Can now extend Cisco ISE to OT domain.
- Now has to right tools and processes for regulatory compliance with AWIA standards



EV auto manufacturer with global operations

Business drivers

- Major outages due to network misconfiguration. No standard on switching platform made it impossible to troubleshoot
- No visibility into entire ICS environment
- Line builders using same IP address ranges across multiple cells required lots of external NAT devices

Solution

- Standardize on Cisco IE3x00 switches to benefit from
 - L2NAT
 - Profinet & CIP support
 - Modularity of port counts
 - Gigabit Ethernet speeds
- Cyber Vision sensor on IE switches to gain 100% visibility without the high cost of building a SPAN collection network

Outcome

- Standardization of IE switches makes it easy to manage the network
- Increased confidence in uptime in the production environment



CPFL Energia builds resilience and regulatory compliance

Business drivers

- Over 700 substations to monitor and secure
- Very old, unmanaged network infrastructure connecting remote grid assets to their control center using satellite links
- No inventory of connected assets, vulnerabilities and risks
- Had to comply with new local cybersecurity regulations

Solution

- Replaced switches in all substations with Catalyst IE3400 and embedded Cyber Vision Sensor
- One Cyber Vision Center per region and one Global Center in HQ
- Cisco Secure Firewalls to filter traffic in/out of substations

Outcome


- Cyber Vision DPI in IE switches limits traffic from substations to the SOC, saving on satellite links
- OT security events sent to SIEM for security analysts to manage OT security incidents
- Now has detailed information on grid assets and events to comply with local regulatory requirements



Conclusion


Putting it All Together... Cisco Industrial Threat Defense

OT Asset Visibility and Security Posture




Zero Trust Security for OT

Secure remote access (ZTNA)



IEC 62443 zone segmentation



Cross-Domain Detection, Investigation & Response



Highly scalable, comprehensive industrial security, embedded in the network

Help your customers secure their operations



Engage with IoT Sales Specialists to maximize your chances of success

iotsalesglobal@cisco.com




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Merci de votre feedback



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